Tuesday April 23, 2019
Tuesday, April 23, 2019
Tuesday April 23, 2019

Angola Press Agency (Luanda)

Angola: Government Reaffirms Commitment to National Policy on Books

The New Times (Kigali)

East Africa: DR Congo, East Africa Seek Collaboration in Malaria Fight

The New Times (Kigali)

Rwanda: SMEs to Make Use of Car-Free Zone to Promote Locally Made Products

Ahramonline – Egypt

Egypt's constitutional amendments passed by 88.83% in referendum - National Elections Authority

Ahramonline – Egypt

Sisi thanks Egyptians for their 'dazzling' participation in constitutional referendum

The Monitor (Kampala)

Uganda: Regional Tea Exports Grow By 21 Percent

The Citizen (Dar es Salaam)

Tanzania: Local Govts Must Do More

A fresh call by experts for local government authorities to play a more central role in efforts to formalise the informal sector is well-timed. It comes as the Central Government is tirelessly seeking ways to ensure that informal businesses contribute more to the country's economy.

For more than 12 years now, successive administrations have attempted to unlock the potential in the informal sector through various interventions - one of which is the programme popularly known by its Kiswahili acronym Mkurabita. There are many such strategies adopted over the years.

But while remarkable progress has been realised, there is obviously a lot more that still needs to be done to tap into the full potential of this sector. One thing that has been emphasized is building the capacity of informal traders.

We also opine that local governments can be critical drivers of this process. This is largely because they are the ones who interact daily at a more personal level with informal traders.

It's the same view shared by experts who took part in a recent workshop themed 'Local Economic Development: Unpacking potentials for accelerated transformation of Tanzania'.

Only deliberate and coordinated efforts between central government and local authorities can help speed up this process.

The New Times – Rwanda

The international economic policy game

By: Koichi Hamada

Until relatively recently, specialists in international relations had little interest in game theory; some were even “frightened” to hear the term, as the chair of one of my presentations put it to me several years ago. Today, many are better informed about the strategic analysis of political actors’ behavior and decision-making. The relevance of such analysis for economic policymaking is no less obvious: each player on the world stage is not acting independently, but rather considers other players’ possible reactions to his or her action.

All human interaction is characterized by a mixture of competition and cooperation. Competition among individuals, businesses, and countries advances human welfare by creating incentives to work hard, innovate, and excel. Cooperation does so by harnessing the strengths of different actors to drive progress toward shared objectives. Which approach is preferable depends on the context, including what the other players are doing?

The mathematical foundations for analyzing both cooperative and non-cooperative interactions among rational agents were developed by the late Nobel laureate John Nash. When there are a large number of participants, and none has a monopoly on power, non-cooperative behavior by many actors can lead to optimal performance. In trade, for example, free competition among economic agents can produce “Pareto efficiency”: resources are allocated in such a way that any reallocation to benefit one actor would hurt at least one other actor.

Competition starts to become a problem when national governments intervene in the game, in order to give their country’s firms an advantage. That is exactly what US President Donald Trump’s administration did when it imposed tariffs on imports from China, which retaliated with its own tariffs on imports from the United States. Far from advancing human welfare, this competition threatens to cause serious damage to both economies – and to the rest of the world.

It’s happened before. The US Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, enacted in 1930 to protect American farmers and other industries, not only created imbalances by hampering competition among economic agents; it also spurred retaliatory measures, ultimately exacerbating the Great Depression.

So, when it comes to trade, we need competition among economic agents, but cooperation among governments. The World Trade Organization was created precisely to facilitate such cooperation, with the WTO Charter dictating that tariffs must be regulated, in order to keep trade broadly beneficial. Within this framework, the Trump administration’s actions are justifiable only if they correct distortions created by China’s trade policy – in particular, its failure adequately to protect intellectual property.

In a world of flexible exchange rates, non-cooperation also serves a useful purpose in monetary policy. Within such a regime – which has prevailed globally since the demise of the Bretton Woods system in 1973 – one country’s monetary expansion, by causing its currency to depreciate, tends to increase employment at home, while undermining employment in countries with which it trades.

As with trade tariffs, this can spur more countries to pursue monetary expansion, in order to weaken their currencies and boost their declining trade competitiveness. The Estonian economist Ragnar Nurkse pointed out, in the 1930s – after the gold standard was abandoned and before the Bretton Woods system was established – such competitive devaluations were “beggar thy neighbor,” leaving both the initiators and the world as a whole worse off.

Barry Eichengreen and Jeffrey D. Sachs demonstrated, however, that countries recovered from the Great Depression only after “jettisoning the gold standard, abandoning deflationary monetary policies, and allowing [their] currency to depreciate.” They showed that non-cooperative monetary policy – set by each country with the objective of achieving domestic macroeconomic stability – produces desirable outcomes for the world. After all, within a flexible exchange-rate regime, a country’s trading partners can always readjust their own monetary policies to counteract or even fully offset any negative effects from its expansionary stance.

Though I once argued that coordination of monetary policy was necessary for better performance under the fixed exchange rate, I now completely agree with them. The rules of the international monetary game changed under flexible exchange rates.

Given this, a laissez-faire approach should prevail in the monetary-policy game. That is why the Trump administration’s criticism of Japan’s monetary expansion – clearly aimed not at impoverishing trading partners, but rather at promoting domestic macroeconomic stability amid very low inflation – is unwarranted.

The balance between competition and cooperation can be difficult to strike. One can only hope for a future in which more political leaders recognize how game theory provides a useful framework for assessing the possibilities and choosing the most promising.